A Fire/EMS InfiniBand security review checks partition layout. What separation should operators confirm?

A Fire/EMS InfiniBand security review should confirm that management PKeys stay separate from data-tenant PKeys on the civic fabric. Separating ops/management partitions from agency data partitions limits which HCAs can reach management domains and reduces the chance that a compromised tenant GPU gains SM-adjacent or fabric-ops reachability. Management nodes joining tenant PKeys with limited membership on the civic fabric fails by concept: even limited membership lets ops reach into payload partitions and erodes the separation between management and data trust boundaries. Letting UFM agents join data-tenant PKeys for fabric telemetry on the civic fabric fails because telemetry access does not justify placing management-plane agents inside tenant data partitions. Letting the default PKey carry management traffic with full membership on the civic fabric fails because the default partition is not a substitute for dedicated management separation; full membership on the default PKey exposes management traffic to unintended members. Exam caveat: management versus data PKey separation is a multi-tenancy security control that applies regardless of partition; putting management traffic on the default PKey with full membership does not remove the need for dedicated partition design. Operational check: list management PKey members and data-tenant PKey members for Fire/EMS, confirm no management nodes hold tenant-PKey membership unless explicitly justified, and remediate any management-to-tenant partition overlap findings before sign-off.