A library system wants volunteers to help draft content but not redeploy production Foundry agents. What should administrators apply?

Library administrators should apply least-privilege role policies that separate content authoring from production Foundry agent deployment rights so volunteers can draft without redeploying live agents. The control works because Azure RBAC (and related Foundry project roles) can grant draft/edit permissions while reserving deploy, connection, and secret-bearing actions to a smaller operations group. That separation protects the production patron experience and municipal change control without blocking volunteer contributions to brochure and program content. Using Contributor role policies that separate evaluation from volunteer drafting rights fails because it draws the boundary in the wrong place — evaluation versus drafting — rather than separating authoring from production deployment, so volunteers could still redeploy live agents. Using Developer role policies that separate monitoring from volunteer authoring rights fails because monitoring versus authoring does not restrict deployment rights, so volunteers could still redeploy production agents and reach connection and secret-bearing actions. Applying Administrator role policies that separate billing from volunteer authoring rights fails because billing separation is unrelated to deployment control and does not block volunteers from redeploying live agents. Exam caveat: least privilege must be reviewed when volunteers become staff or when temporary elevate-access is granted for releases; stale high privilege is common in civic IT. Operational check: map roles to duties (author vs deployer), remove broad project rights from volunteer identities, require privileged access workstations or PIM-style elevation for production deploy, and audit role assignments quarterly against the library’s AI operating roster.