An engineer wants to change the employee SSID from WPA3-Enterprise to a shared PSK “just for the weekend festival.” What process should stop that?
Select an answer to reveal the explanation.
Short Explanation
Flipping corp Wi-Fi to a shared weekend password is not a cute festival hack—it is a security change. Run it through change management or do not do it. Polls and log-off switches are not approvals.
Full Explanation
An engineer who wants to change the employee SSID from WPA3-Enterprise to a shared PSK just for a weekend festival must be stopped by formal change management with documented approval before security-affecting SSID profile edits. Temporary weakening of AKM for convenience creates handshake capture and shared-secret risks that outlast the ribbon-cutting. Municipal change control exists precisely for “just this weekend” security regressions.
Silent CLI edits with no ticket because festivals are temporary bypass audit and rollback discipline. A social-media poll among attendees to choose encryption mode is not a security governance process. Disabling logging so the weekend change cannot be audited later is evidence destruction dressed as operations.
Exam caveat: emergency changes can be accelerated, but they still need recorded approval, time bounds, and restoration criteria. Operational check: require a change record naming the SSID, AKM before/after, backout plan, and approver; verify production still matches the approved post-festival state. In municipal WLAN programs, write the control into standards and verify it during change review so the next project inherits the same bar rather than rediscovering the failure mode under outage pressure.