A co-op assigns a technician to a custom login class that includes view and network permissions but not configure. What happens when that technician attempts to enter configuration mode on a POP router?

Junos login classes are built from discrete permission bits, and entering configuration mode specifically requires a permission tied to configuration access — a class that grants view (seeing operational and configuration state) and network (running network diagnostic tools) but omits configuration-related permission does not, by that combination alone, unlock configuration mode. Attempting to enter configuration mode with such a class results in the CLI denying the request outright, rather than allowing entry with some hidden restriction applied afterward. View permission is deliberately scoped to visibility, not modification — being able to see the current configuration is a different capability from being able to change it, and Junos keeps those separated so a monitoring-focused role can't accidentally, or intentionally, drift into making changes. There's no secondary RADIUS challenge gating entry to configuration mode specifically; authentication happens once at login, and configuration-mode access afterward is governed purely by the account's login-class permissions, not a re-authentication step. Nor does Junos allow entry into configuration mode and then silently discard commits — if the class lacks configuration access, the attempt to even open configuration mode fails immediately with a permission-denied response, which is the clearer and more predictable behavior for troubleshooting a misconfigured class.