A city’s public snowplow-location API accidentally shares the same exposure path as internal fleet-admin services. What access-control boundary should be applied?
Select an answer to reveal the explanation.
Short Explanation
Public plow dots on a map are a postcard; fleet-admin tools are the keys to the garage. Keep the public API read-only for location data and tuck admin services behind stronger auth and network walls. Hidden paths, shared CDN admin edges, and anonymous write admin access blur that line on purpose—and lose.
Full Explanation
Access control for applications and services must separate public-facing, low-privilege interfaces from privileged administrative functions. Public APIs should expose only the minimum data and operations needed by citizens, while admin services require stronger authentication, finer authorization, and network isolation. Security through obscurity, co-locating admin APIs on the public edge, or anonymous privileged writes expand the attack surface. Clear service boundaries reduce unauthorized control of municipal operational systems.