A municipal Security Hub administrator account aggregates findings. Leadership requires that member accounts cannot silently mute critical GuardDuty findings from central view. What should the architect emphasize?

When a municipal Security Hub administrator account aggregates findings, leadership should insist on a delegated Security Hub administrator with organization-wide aggregation and governance so critical GuardDuty findings remain visible centrally. Member accounts must not be able to silently mute or suppress org-critical risk out of central view through unconstrained local administration. Central aggregation plus guardrails around finding updates preserves SOC situational awareness after phishing waves, misconfigurations, and anomalous API activity across departments.

Letting each member account run an isolated Security Hub with no delegated admin so local teams “own suppression entirely” recreates blind spots the city tried to eliminate. Turning off GuardDuty organization auto-enable so members opt in only after quarterly boards delays detection for months. Granting member admins unrestricted securityhub:BatchUpdateFindings so they can clear tickets faster enables exactly the silent muting leadership forbade.

Exam caveat: Security Hub delegated administrator and finding aggregation are multi-account governance features; suppression workflows must be controlled, not unilaterally local for critical severity. Operational check: confirm delegated admin and auto-enable, raise a critical GuardDuty finding in a member account, verify it appears in the admin account, attempt member-side suppression under policy, and ensure SOC notifications still fire for critical severities.