A building inspections unit learns how Microsoft 365 Copilot decides which inspection files to surface. What access rule should staff understand?

Microsoft 365 Copilot accesses data based on the signed-in user's existing permissions; it surfaces content the user can already reach with those permissions. Building inspections staff learning how Copilot decides which inspection files to surface should understand that access rule as the core data-security implication. Copilot surfacing content the site owner can already access with existing site permissions would apply the owner's access instead of the requester's, which is incorrect; Copilot's permission-aligned retrieval follows the signed-in user, so a sealed file the owner can open stays hidden from an inspector who lacks access. Copilot surfacing content the signed-in user can already access within followed SharePoint sites would incorrectly limit results to followed sites, which is not how Copilot's permission-aligned retrieval works; Copilot can surface any content across the tenant that the signed-in user can currently access, not just followed sites. Copilot surfacing content the signed-in user can access with an internal sensitivity label applied would incorrectly require an internal label for visibility, which is incorrect; Copilot surfaces anything the signed-in user has current item-level access to with or without that label, and the label alone never grants access. Exam caveat: this is a core Domain 2 Copilot data-security implication at describe depth—permission-aligned access, not privilege escalation myths. Operational check: verify sealed complaint libraries exclude unauthorized inspectors, test Copilot as a least-privileged inspector account to confirm sealed files do not appear, and remediate oversharing if results surprise the team.